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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tical legislation might be upheld as constitutional. The court stating
in the Herndon opinion that utterances "inimical to the general wel-
fare" and "involving danger of substantive evil" may be penalized
in the exercise of the state's police power, 6 and that a state's "police
statutes may only be declared unconstitutional where they are arbi-
trary or unreasonable 7 attempts to exercise authority vested in the
state in the public interest." In the Thomas case that part of the
Texas court's opinion was upheld which stated that "The State under
its police power may enact laws which interfere indirectly and to a
limited extent with the right of speech or the liberty of the people
where they are reasonably necessary for the protection of the general
public." 8
The court in the principal case supported its holding with the
reasoning of a prior Supreme Court decision,9 and held that the
slight restriction of the freedom of the press prescribed by the statute
is fully justified when the situation of the victim of the assault and
the handicap under which prosecuting officers labor in such cases, is
weighed against the benefit of publishing the identity of the victim in
connection with the details of the crime. This prior case involved a
New Hampshire statute similar to the one in the principal case which
was attacked as violating one's right to freedom of speech. The
Supreme Court therein said: "It has been well observed that such
utterances (those which by their very utterance inflict injury 10 or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace) are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that might be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." The Wis-
consin statute was held to have been intended to protect the victim
from embarrassment and offensive publicity which, the court felt, had
a strong tendency to affect her future standing in society. The legis-
lation was thus justified.
D.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SuPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED
BY SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHOUT A WARRANT.-The petitioner
McDonald was convicted on charges of carrying on a lottery known
as the numbers game based on evidence obtained by a search
made without a warrant. Upon trial it appeared that police officers,
having kept McDonald under surveillance for several months, raided
his quarters after one of them unlawfully entered the building through
6 See note 2 supra.
7 Italics ours.
8 See note 3 supra.
9 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 86 L. ed. 1031 (1942).
10 Italics ours.
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RECENT DECISIONS
the landlady's bedroom window and then opened the front door to
admit the others. After searching the rooms on the ground floor,
they proceeded to the second floor and upon coming to a closed door
an officer stood on a chair and peered through the transom and ob-
served McDonald and another in the room, as well as numbers slips,
money and adding machines. Under orders from the police officer,
McDonald opened the door whereupon he was arrested and the num-
bers slips, money and adding machines were seized. At the trial the
petitioner moved to suppress the evidence seized at the time of the
arrest; the motion was denied. On appeal of this ruling to the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia the order of the lower court
was sustained on the grounds that McDonald had no right to com-
plain of the unlawful entry into the rooming house because he had
no interest in the premises searched or the property seized.' Upon
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, conviction re-
versed; evidence obtained by the search should have been suppressed
and the property returned to petitioner as search was made without
a warrant and no emergency or compelling reasons justified its non-
procurement, hence it violated the Fourth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States. 2 McDonald v. United States, - U. S.
93 L. ed. 144 (1948).
In order to safeguard the right of privacy, the courts have re-
peatedly held that the Fourth Amendment should be construed lib-
erally 3 and its protective shield extended to both the guilty and inno-
cent alike.4 The instant case, in extending the protection of the
amendment to a roomer in a rooming house rejects the view held in
the case of Gibson v. United States5 wherein a mere guest was de-
nied the right to object to admission of evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment on the grounds that such objection may
be raised only by one who claims ownership in or right to possession
of the premises searched or the property seized. The lower courts'
proposal to extend this feudalistic concept of estate in land to the
case of a roomer was rightly rejected as was aptly pointed out by
Mr. Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in the principal case
I McDonald v. United States, 166 F. 2d 957 (App. D. C. 1948).
2 
. S. CoNsT. AMEND. IV provides: "The right of the people to be
secure . . . , against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, . .. particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
3 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 76 L. ed. 877 (1932) ; Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 75 L. ed. 374 (1931); Byars
v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 71 L. ed. 520 (1927) ; Gouled v. United States,
255 U. S. 298, 65 L. ed. 647 (1921); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616,
29 L. ed. 746 (1886).
4 I re Go-Bart Importing Co., supra note 3; Agnello v. United States,
269 U. S. 20, 70 L. ed. 145 (1925); In re Gouled, supra note 3; Weeks v.
United States, 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652 (1914).
5 149 F. 2d 381 (App. D. C. 1945), cert. denied sub nom. O'Kelley v.
United States, 326 U. S. 724, 90 L. ed. 429 (1945).
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wherein he says ". . . it seems to me that each tenant of a building,
while he has no right to exclude from the common hallway those who
enter lawfully, does have a personal and constitutionally protected
interest in the integrity and security of the entire building against
unlawful breaking and entry." 6
In recognizing the constitutional right of a roomer to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure the Supreme Court seems to
follow the reasoning of three lower court decisions which recognized
the rights of a lessee or a licensee,7 guest or employee 8 and a roomer
in a private dwelling house.9
The effect of the decision in the instant case in no way affects
the well settled principle of law that a reasonable search and seizure
may be made as an incident of a lawful arrest,10 however, a fortiori,
a search made without a warrant can not be justified as an incident
of arrest unless the arrest itself was lawful.
In reversing the lower courts the Supreme Court followed the
decisions in Johnson v. United States" and Trupiano v. United
States12 which held that where there is ample opportunity to secure
a search warrant and no emergency or compelling reasons exist such
warrant must first be obtained before a valid search may be made.
Where the Fourth Amendment has been violated and the evidence
obtained as a result thereof is tendered in a federal court, such evi-
dence will be suppressed.' 3
The facts of the instant case fall within the proscription of the
Fourth Amendment,14 and justifiably so, when we reduce the issue
to the maintenance of the security of the individual against unreason-
able searches and seizures versus the suppression of acts malum
prohibitum; to hold otherwise would be contrary to the fundamental
principles of liberty and an invasion of one's indefeasible right of
personal security and private property.
J. C. B.
6 See McDonald v. United States, - U. S. -- 93 L. ed. 144, 149 (1948).
7 United States v. DeBousi, 32 F. 2d 902 (Mass. 1929).8 Alvau et al. v. United States, 33 F. 2d 467 (C. C. A. 9th 1929).
9 Brown et al. v. United States, 83 F. 2d 383 (C. C. A. 3d 1936).
10 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 76 L. ed. 877 (1932) ; Marron
v. United States, 275 U. S. 192, 72 L. ed. 231 (1927); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U. S. 20, 70 L. ed. 145 (1925) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S.
383, 58 L. ed. 652 (1914).
11 Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 92 L. ed. 323 (1948).
12 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 92 L. ed. 1198 (1948).
13 Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652 (1914).
14 For an interesting exposition of the history of the Fourth Amendment
see Mr. Justice Bradley's opinion in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616,
624-30, 29 L. ed. 746, 749-51 (1886).
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